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Abstract 
This paper analyzes North Korean ports in light of existing models of port system evolution. 
It reviews the economic and political factors shaping port concentration in developed, 
developing, and socialist countries. A database on vessel movements allows for the analysis 
of individual North Korean port traffic by total capacity circulated, cargo type, fleet 
nationality, immediate origin and destination, and berthing time. While ideological factors 
and military control hamper port modernization and trade openness, traffic concentration at 
the Pyongyang-Nampo gateway highlights the spatial polarization in the capital region at the 
expense of Eastern ports for which inland transport limitations and industrial decline have 
become major issues. The North Korean case only partly fits general models because traffic 
concentration occurs due to geopolitical isolation and internal limitations rather than 
economic and trade growth.  
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1. Introduction 
The fate of ports has long been associated with unpredictable circumstances (Jackson, 
1983). Throughout the world, the improvement of transport systems and the integration of 
ports within multimodal transport chains foster port concentration and competition (Slack, 
1985; Hoare, 1986). The literature depicts how ports adapt to change through different sets of 
local and national policies, strengthening their performance and their insertion in intermodal 
systems and value chains (Notteboom and Rodrigue, 2005; Jacobs and Hall, 2007). While 
such trends seem to be valid for ports operating in relatively opened economies, it is not yet 
verified whether they apply to the constrained and autarchic economy that has become the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK; hereafter referred to as North Korea). 
Comparing North Korea with other constrained economies would improve our understanding 
of the relation between port systems and regional change. Most studies of port systems, which 
focus mainly on developed nations due to more accessible information, have neglected social 
and political considerations explaining traffic change. Ports in relatively closed or less-
developed economies often receive little attention, because they are not performing well 
enough or are not sufficiently inserted in the networks of global players. This is regrettable 
because not only periods of growth but also periods of decline shall be analyzed in order to 
better understand the transport geography of spatial change.  
 In the 1960s and 1970s, North Korea was regarded as the most dynamic East Asian 
economy after Japan. However, it started to falter, declining from the 1980s onwards due to 
geopolitical change and economic mismanagement (Oh and Hassig, 1999). The two major 
factors are the disappearance of the socialist block in 1991, with which North Korea handled 
most of its trade, and the death of president Kim Il-Sung in 1994, which led to a political 
crisis accentuated by natural disasters and famine. In the late 1990s, the regime implemented 
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important economic reforms, introducing some elements of the market economy
1
. The new 
attitude of the current regime is closely associated with South Korea’s efforts for economic 
cooperation, as seen in the two inter-Korean presidential summits of 2000 and 2007, and the 
relatively successful development of the Gaeseong and Geumgang special zones near the 
border (Ducruet et al., 2008). In addition, an industrial corridor is emerging between 
Pyongyang and Nampo, the capital’s gateway, through joint ventures between local and 
foreign companies (Roussin and Ducruet, 2007). However, there remains a debate among 
specialists on whether such reforms are paving the way towards a Chinese model or if they 
remain an accidental survival strategy (Yoon, 2006).  
 North Korean ports are strategically located in Northeast Asia (Figure 1), notably 
regarding their potential for connecting the Europe-Asia land bridge in a context of regional 
economic growth and integration (Choi et al., 2003; Rozman, 2004). However, North Korea 
remains a barrier rather than a bridge and most land-based shipments from Japan, China, and 
Korea preferably use either the Trans Siberian or Trans China railroads. The eight 
international trading ports are regularly distributed along the East and West coasts, in 
accordance with the configuration of the urban system (Figure 2). The study of North Korean 
ports is worthwhile for realizing two main objectives: 
 
a) Confronting existing models of port system evolution to the case of a politically 
isolated and economically constrained country; 
b) Complementing the general knowledge on North Korean geography and economy by 
looking at how geopolitical change and regional dynamics are highlighted through the 
evolving traffic distribution.   
 
                                                 
1
 Notably in the agricultural sector, price system, entrepreneurship, and foreign investment procedures.  
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While available information about North Korea remains limited to partial political and 
economic data (Jo and Adler, 2002a), we propose using a world database on vessel 
movements provided by Lloyd’s Marine Intelligence Unit (LMIU), an independent 
organization which insures approximately 80% of the world fleet. Aggregating data on vessel 
capacities makes it possible to obtain a snapshot of the situation of North Korean ports along 
three main periods: growth and stagnation before the collapse of the USSR (1985-1991), 
geopolitical isolation (1992-1998), economic reforms, inter-Korean cooperation, and foreign 
investments (1999-2006). Such information is by far the most accurate source for studying 
constrained economies, because all other governmental organizations provide only rough 
estimates of North Korea’s maritime trade (Ducruet and Jo, 2008). North Korean ports are 
controlled by the army that does not provide any information on traffic and infrastructure. 
Because a comprehensive study of North Korean ports and transport system is lacking, this 
research also synthesizes numerous and dispersed information from economic intelligence, 
governmental reports, and press releases published on this country.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of 
the relevant literature on port systems in transport geography. Section 3 represents the core of 
the paper. It first introduces a brief historical background of North Korean ports, then explains 
the methodology, and goes through the analysis of port traffic distribution along the three 
main periods. Concluding remarks in section 4 discuss the lessons drawn from the case of the 
North Korean port system.  
 
2. Port system evolution in transport geography 
2.1 General trends 
The analysis of port systems is an important part of transport and regional 
development studies (Hoyle, 1974). Increased globalization has fostered a global 
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transportation system that redesigns inter-port relationships on various geographical scales 
(Slack, 1993).  
The port system is a rather vague geographical concept. On the one hand, it 
corresponds to the port region or land area within which port activities substantially impact 
the economic structure (e.g. employment), but it is often confounded with the hinterland that 
reflects the market area in which inbound and outbound port-related transport flows take 
place. It is also understood as a group of ports situated in geographical proximity, such as the 
maritime façade, which is based on a single and continuous coastline, and the port range that 
is defined by interdependency among ports sharing multiple vessel calls. Finally, the port 
network represents the service coverage of a given carrier, regardless of the geographical 
proximity.  
Table 1 provides an overview of the main port concentration studies. There is a 
gradual shift from concentration to deconcentration studies. Empirical evidence highlights the 
limits of excessive concentration in several parts of the world, defined by traffic capture at 
one main load centre. Concentration, for instance, stems from the path-dependency of large 
agglomerations (e.g. New York) and the resilience of large load centers (e.g. Hong Kong) 
implementing efficient urban and port planning policies avoiding congestion. Deconcentration 
occurs due to new port development, carrier selection, global operation strategies, 
governmental policies, congestion, and lack of space at main load centers.  
Port traffic is related to economic activities and spatially spreads through a transport 
system. Therefore, changes in traffic distribution are closely related to changes in the spatial 
organization of the economy. The degree of concentration within a port system can be a good 
indicator of regional dynamics. For little known countries such as North Korea, lack of 
information on internal changes may be overcome by examining the distribution of port traffic 
over time. Before evaluating to what extent port concentration occurs in North Korea and the 
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implications for such a phenomenon, a closer look at the specificities of port systems in 
developing and socialist countries is needed.  
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
2.2 Port system evolution in developing and socialist countries 
 Defining thoroughly the notions of developing country and socialist country would 
reach beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, the two emerged in the specific context of 
the Cold War era, defined as the Second World (socialist) and the Third World (developing), 
by comparison with the First World (developed or capitalist). Different categories have been 
proposed, notably after the Cold War, such as socialist developing countries, applying to the 
world’s only five remaining communist countries i.e. China, Vietnam, Laos, Cuba, and North 
Korea. The main differences between socialist and developing port systems involve land 
transport, traffic distribution, and traffic type (Table 2). In the former Soviet Union, the 
spatial division of port functions serving the continental hinterland centralized in Moscow 
formed a star-shaped railway network aimed at controlling access to the different seas 
(Thorez, 1998a). Although socialist leaders often expressed their disregard for sea transport, 
maritime trade in socialist economies grew from 2% in 1939 to 9% in 1991 (Vigarié, 1995), 
reflecting the extension of their influence to countries only accessible through sea transport 
(e.g. Cuba, Vietnam, and Africa). After the collapse of the USSR, ports located in newly 
independent countries (NICs) adapted to new hinterland patterns by diversifying traffic and 
modernizing infrastructure (Thorez, 1998b). Maritime transport in socialist countries was long 
perceived as costly, of little use, and limited to coastal shipping. The new geopolitical context 
forced Russia to develop long-distance trades with remote trade partners such as Cuba 
(Vigarié, 1995). In China, following the Open Door Policy (1978), port development occurred 
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despite inland transport limitations with the development of special economic zones and open 
cities along the coast (Lo, 1989).  
Since the 1960s, literature on port systems has emphasized the impact of 
containerization on Asian colonial and post-colonial port cities (Basu, 1985; Murphey, 1989; 
Kidwai, 1989). Technological changes in shipping and globalization processes caused port 
concentration and selection, questioning the notion that the amount of cargo handled by the 
port was strictly proportional to the economic weight of the surrounding region (Todd, 1993). 
The model proposed by Taaffe et al. (1963) shows the degradation and disappearance of 
minor ports due to the growth of gateway ports at the head of transport corridors, where 
agglomeration economies are intensified. The argument of Smolensky and Ratajczak (1965) 
about the shift of larger cities from centre to periphery is questioned by Stern and Hayuth 
(1984), who observed that remotely located ports have limited local impact due to their 
dependence on inland core regions. Although port development relates to the existing urban 
structure of a given country, attempts to develop peripheral regions through port activities in 
developing countries have been rather limited (Fujita and Mori, 1996). Spatial concentration 
of population, economic activity, and port traffic also appeared in socialist countries such as 
Cuba (Alfonso, 2001). 
Besides the aforementioned issues, port development in developing and socialist 
countries is dictated by wider mechanisms of state planning, resource allocation, and 
settlement structure. The relative absence of property rights, lack of international openness 
and human capital, limited infrastructure and manufactured inputs, small market size, and 
complex governance often result in a lack of incentives and innovation (Edwards, 1993; 
Tybout, 2000). This is exactly the case in North Korea, where reliance on heavy industries 
and military control prevented the emergence of a competitive advantage in the world 
economy (Jo, 2000). Limited foreign trade, protectionism, and capital stock resulted in small 
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port capacity, outdated infrastructure, and inadequate cargo handling facilities (Ahn, 2001; 
Yoon and Babson, 2002; Ahn, 2003). As seen in Table 3, North Korean ports remain 
relatively small, poorly equipped, and specialized in the handling of bulky products, while 
limitations of nautical accessibility indicates wide gaps with global shipping standard 
requirements. As a result, most cargo is loaded and unloaded by hand using a large quantity of 
workforce at the docks (Ducruet and Roussin, 2007a). This situation can be accentuated by 
bureaucratic obstacles and institutionalized corruption that is defined by favored military and 
power-holding elites having better access to information, foreign manufactured goods, travel 
opportunities, nepotism, and cronyism (Bermudez, 2006). In Indonesia, cumbersome customs 
regulations once hampered the spread of containerization (Airriess, 1989) and still nowadays 
more than 80% of Indonesian trade is transshipped through Singapore due to low port 
capacity locally (Ghani, 2006). Similarly, the national renovation policy of Vietnamese ports 
faces low technical standards and port capacity (Vinh, 2004). In other cases such as Baltic 
ports, port reforms and increased private participation in port management allows a steady 
modernization (Brodin, 2003). Whether such trends are reflected in a socialist developing 
country like North Korea is verified in the next sections.  
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
3. Port concentration in North Korea 
3.1 Background and research perspectives 
Centrally located for economic, trade and cultural exchange amongst neighboring 
powers, the Korean peninsula has always been under pressure for geopolitical control, 
resulting in the reluctance of Korean elites opening the country (Roussin, 2008; Yoon, 2008). 
Following successive short periods of expansion and long periods of closure over centuries, 
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the Treaty of Ganghwa (1876) forced Korea opening its main ports to foreign trade. Japan 
seizes Korea’s transportation system in 1905 and further develops ports during the occupation 
period (1910-1945), notably on the East coast. After the Korean War (1950-1953) during 
which many port sites were heavily damaged, the regime of Kim Il-Sung remains focused on 
developing primarily inland transportation for border trade with China and the Soviet Union 
(Ahn, 2003), while the few improvements at ports resulted from Soviet, Chinese, and 
Japanese support, such as the creation of Rajin port, storage facilities, and oil piers in the 
1970s (Cotton, 1996).  
 The legacy of contemporary port development in the northern part of the Korean 
peninsula directly results in a concentration of traffic on the East coast (Figure 3). However, 
the share of the West coast has constantly increased until nowadays. What are the factors 
leading to such reversal? Is it only explained by geopolitical change, or is it also related to 
internal factors? This phenomenon of concentration shift that is made evident by measuring 
Gini coefficient based on container traffic is, primarily, the result of changing political 
relations and trade patterns. The loss of socialist trades after the fall of the USSR in 1991 
would explain the cease of shipments with Russian neighboring ports such as Vladivostok and 
Nakhodka, resulting in the decline of the East Coast. But this cannot account for the 
continuous growth of traffic of the country in general. Eventually, North Korea maintained 
trade relations with Japan and China, and also with South Korea with which 90% of 
shipments use sea transport due to persisting inland blockade at the DMZ. Thus, other factors 
shall be researched internally.  
The internal changes in the country’s spatial organization and the successive planning 
policies are not well-known, notably with regard to port activities. The governmental Korea 
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Ocean Shipping Agency (KOSA)
2
 that is based in Pyongyang is responsible for all ship-
related services, but there is no existing information about the country’s port policy. By 
looking at the evolution of urban population of main North Korean cities, existing studies 
point at a major demographic concentration in Pyongyang and other western cities (Jo and 
Adler, 2002b). This phenomenon of urban primacy, which is typical of developing countries, 
may constitute the very cause of the westward shift of port traffic. Because Nampo is the main 
port on the west coast and is well connected by road to the core economic region, it has 
become the country’s main maritime gateway. From a relatively balanced situation due to the 
dynamism of both maritime facades, there is a dramatic increase of concentration (0.8) after 
1992 onwards. Only a detailed analysis of the weight, composition, distribution, origin, and 
destination of port traffic by main period between 1985 and 2005 may shed light on the 
respective roles of local and global factors underlying port concentration in North Korea.  
Data was calculated in identical ways for each period, based on the agglomerated 
vessel movements: traffic volume and composition, direct origin and destination, average 
berthing time, average vessel size, and share of North Korean vessels. All indicators express 
one aspect of port performance. By complementing the results with other sources and field 
study
3
, the distribution and evolution of this performance shall shed new light on the possible 
relations between economic and political factors affecting port concentration. 
 
3.2 Soviet influence: the dominance of East coast ports (1985-1991) 
During the heyday of the North Korean economy, traffic is relatively balanced 
between East and West coasts of the country (Figure 4). Total traffic is slightly more 
concentrated in Nampo, but container traffic clearly indicates the dominance of the East coast. 
                                                 
2
 The KOSA is notably responsible for permit delivery, cargo handling management, quay booking, surveying, 
ship repair and inspection, bunkering and crew salvation, as well as administrative documentation, customs, bills 
of lading, and receives complains in case of good damage during shipping or stevedoring.  
3
 Two of the authors made regular visits to North Korea including Nampo, Pyongyang, and Gaeseong during the 
research period. 
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Notably, Cheongjin and Rajin have the highest share of regular shipping. This deviates from 
the general situation defined by a dominance of bulky products in North Korea. A recent 
study estimates the share of raw materials (e.g. mine products) in domestic transport around 
71% of domestic transport flows were raw materials (e.g. mine products), carried dominantly 
by rail and road that occupied 74% and 18% of the modal split respectively in 1989 (Tsuji, 
2005). Their role as important links between Japan and mainland China is notably due to their 
advantage as North Korea’s only ice-free ports during winter, in comparison with neighboring 
Russian competitors which have less capacity. Indeed, eastern ports show a dominant share of 
their traffic with Japan, except for Heungnam and Songjin that are more connected outside 
Northeast Asia. Eastern ports also have a lower share of North Korean vessels, showing their 
higher degree of openness to foreign trade. Finally, Cheongjin and Rajin have a higher share 
of general cargo shipments, probably due to their location in a forestry area but also due to 
their role as transit ports. At that period, Wonsan stood by far as North Korea’s largest coastal 
petrochemical complex, what is reflected in its large share of tanker traffic and highest 
average vessel size. Because of its good inland transport links with Pyongyang and is also an 
important naval base, it acquired a strategic commercial and military role for energy storage 
and supply, transportation, shipbuilding and repair, and production of railroad rolling stock. 
In comparison, the west coast has a rather secondary role in the port system. Of 
course, as the gateway to Pyongyang, Nampo has the biggest traffic volume, and a diversified 
portfolio in terms of traffic origin and destination. It has a higher proportion of bulk traffic to 
cover the needs of Pyongyang for construction materials (e.g. cement), but this is also the case 
for ports located nearby large cities (e.g. Heungnam, Cheongjin). Although the problem of 
low equipment is already widespread in North Korea during this period, Nampo is 
permanently constrained by the West Sea Barrage, completed in 1986, through which vessels 
larger than 50,000 deadweight tons cannot pass. West coast ports, but also Wonsan, also have 
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the particularity to suffer more than other ports from political instabilities, due to their 
location near the inter-Korean border area. Their higher share of North Korean vessels may 
illustrate the tension between North Korea and South Korea, resulting in the limited 
permission given to foreign vessels accessing those ports. Indeed, Nampo has developed as a 
key military and industrial complex whose proximity with the capital city makes very 
strategic. Overall, both façades show relatively high average berthing periods, except for 
Wonsan due to the regular ferry link with Niigata, Japan.  
 
3.3 Isolation: the shift to the West (1992-1998) 
The second period (Figure 5) shows a major concentration of traffic at Nampo. East 
coast ports have greatly declined. The loss of socialist trades undoubtedly harmed the 
relations between eastern ports and former Soviet ports. Heungnam has most declined 
probably due to heavier dependence on Soviet trades. Local factors also explain this trend, as 
in the case of Wonsan, from which numerous factories were moved in the mid-1990s so as to 
create a new and secured military and industrial complex in the mountainous northern areas. 
As a result, Wonsan’s total traffic and share of tanker traffic have both greatly reduced. The 
deterioration of roads and obstruction of tunnels also started to impact negatively on the 
dynamism of Wonsan that is increasingly isolated from the capital region (Roussin and 
Ducruet, 2006). In fact, the country is isolated geopolitically, while internal areas have 
become less connected internally (Ducruet and Roussin, 2007b). 
The decline of the East coast is counterbalanced by some exceptions. For instance, the 
special economic zone of Rajin-Seonbong was opened in 1991 as part of the larger United 
Nations Tumen River Development Programme, resulting in a higher traffic growth than other 
ports. A recent study concluded that such increase was due to the construction of the project 
rather than to its operation (Jo and Ducruet, 2007), as seen in the large share of bulk products. 
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The study also demonstrated that the absence of a manufacturing base would be a better 
explanation of the limited success than geographical remoteness and political tensions. Thus, 
increased trade flows were mostly explained by land-based traffic with neighboring Chinese 
provinces. From the mid-1990s, China started improving Rajin’s road connections while 
building new container facilities for improving its access to the Pacific (Cotton, 1996). 
Notably, Rajin provides Japan with direct maritime connection to the Trans-Siberia-Railroad 
(TSR) and Trans-China-Railroad (TCR). Rajin, Cheongjin, and Wonsan keep the highest 
share of regular shipping (that is also high in Heungnam), the first due to their inland 
connections with China, while Wonsan maintains its regular ferry service with Niigata, 
avoiding too much decline.  
Comparatively, the traffic structure of western ports has not much changed since the 
previous period. General cargo remains dominant in general, while bulk traffic is more needed 
at larger urban and industrial agglomerations. The specificity of Nampo is to have kept a wide 
diversity of maritime connections, while other ports are becoming dominantly connected with 
Japan. Isolation and geopolitical change provoked a retreat of North Korea from the 
international scene, resulting in more short-sea and less long-distance connections, except for 
Nampo, the gateway to Pyongyang. Paradoxically, the share of North Korean vessels 
remained higher for southern ports due to prolonged political tensions, but it has slightly 
reduced in Haeju. Also, the general increase of average berthing time that also reflects North 
Korea’s isolation is not matched by Wonsan that keeps privileged relations with Japan 
through the ferry link. Not only the changes in international trade relations are highlighted, 
but also the internal factors that are based on limited openness and self-sufficiency. This 
situation was about to change with the growing involvement of China and South Korea in 
North Korean affairs.  
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3.4 Chinese and South Korean influence: the dominance of West coast ports (1999-2006) 
The last period is marked by important changes in the country’s behavior toward the 
outside world. Although tensions have been exacerbated due to nuclear crisis and prolonged 
embargo, international trade and foreign investments increased substantially after the first 
inter-Korean summit of 2000. At the same time, China exerts a growing influence on the 
development of North Korea, in the manufacturing and mining sectors for instance, and has 
become its leading trade partner with almost 40% of North Korea’s international trade in 
2005, while South Korea, the second largest trade partner, occupies 25%.  
Nampo maintains its position as North Korea’s main port (Figure 6). While South 
Korea’s plans to build a container terminal and freight station in Nampo have failed due to 
politics, China has been more successful in supporting the construction of a new container 
berth (Lloyd’s Register, 2006). Nampo concentrates most new investments, such as the new 
Songgwan terminal (2001) but North Korea’s plan designing the Wawoo port district as a 
special economic zone was cancelled (see Figure 2). Other ports have kept declining 
dramatically. Heungnam still generates more traffic due to its situation within the large 
Hamheung industrial complex. The decline of Rajin confirms the preference for border trade 
with China, the limited success of the special economic zone, and the limited use of the port 
for transit trade with the Pacific. Another important phenomenon is the dramatic shift of 
population and economic activities from East to West in a context of de-industrialization 
(Ducruet and Roussin, 2007c). A good example is Haeju’s growth due to sand barging from 
the Han River, in cooperation with South Korea. However, the decision made at the second 
inter-Korean presidential summit to build a second industrial complex in Haeju has not yet 
been implemented.  
One of the main impacts of humanitarian aid is the increase of tanker traffic at all 
North Korean ports. It is, in fact, limited to one peak from 1999 to 2001 and relies mostly on 
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United States’ food and oil assistance. One exception is the case of Songjin where tanker 
traffic better relates to the KEDO
4
 project, but the latter was officially cancelled in 2006. The 
growth of aid traffic was interestingly supported by a shift of maritime connections towards 
South Korean ports, resulting in hub dependence (Ducruet, 2008). South Korean ports are 
well located to handle North Korean flows in terms of centrality - proximity to the North 
Korean market - and intermediacy - facilitation of transshipment for ocean carriers. This 
situation is made evident because of the growing technical discrepancy between northern and 
southern ports, and is reinforced by South Korea’s strategy of becoming Northeast Asia’s 
logistics hub.  
Despite this trend of hub concentration at South Korean ports, important connections 
remain with Japanese and Russian ports, notably for East coast ports. For instance, Rajin is 
well located for Russian trade, which increased threefold from US $68 million in 2001 to US 
$232 million in 2005 (Ministry of Unification in South Korea, 2005). Wonsan has kept 
connections with Japan, although trade declined twofold from US $474 million in 2001 to US 
$194 million in 2005. Overall, the share of South Korean connections has increased in all 
North Korean ports, resulting in an unprecedented share of regular shipping, notably in the 
East. Whether caused by the establishment of inter-Korean hub traffic in Heungnam 
(Joongang Daily, 2006) or other phenomena, Heungnam welcomes the largest ships on 
average. Given the intermingling of aid traffic and inter-Korean shipments, it is difficult to 
separate the two processes at stake in North Korean port traffic change.  
Some aspects of the North Korean port system have not much changed. Despite trade 
growth and openness, the North Korean fleet remains dominant in ports close to South Korea. 
This share is high in Nampo despite infrastructure modernization and increased links with the 
                                                 
4
 The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization was founded in 1995 by the US, South Korea, and 
Japan to construct a light water reactor to be completed in 2003.  
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South Korean port of Incheon following the inter-Korean maritime agreement
5
 of 2005. This 
indicates that the army maintains its control on vessel selection at strategically located ports. 
The share of North Korean vessels increased in Cheongjin, but this is better explained by its 
general decline as it was recently qualified as a dormant port (Pons, 2006). Rajin also showed 
a retreat of foreign vessels and an increase of berthing time. The general reduction of long 
distance connections (i.e. outside Northeast Asia) marks the continued decline of the country, 
while it remains important for Cheongjin and Heungnam only due to humanitarian aid from 
developed countries.  
Beside changes in trade patterns and geopolitics, one major restrictive factor affecting 
East coast ports is the deterioration of the domestic land transport system. The road network is 
only 7% paved nowadays; most highways are concentrated in the west around the capital 
region, where 20% of the operating factories are located (Bang, 2004). This is confirmed by 
the distribution of domestic inland traffic: 30% in the South Pyongan province, 10% in the 
North Pyongan province, 24% in the North Hamgyeong province, and 17% in the South 
Hamgyeong province (Tsuji, 2005). The lack of inland connectivity between the different 
provinces also reflects military concerns: the army keeps a firm control on interurban 
movements and plans the road network for defense rather than economic purposes (Roussin 
and Ducruet, 2006). Therefore, railways remain the only transportation mode capable of 
carrying the goods generated by mines, and of reaching remote, mountainous areas (Tsuji, 
2004). The limited internal connectivity has gradually resulted in the concentration of traffic 
at Nampo, Pyongyang’s main (and only) maritime gateway, between which the 10-lane Youth 
Hero motorway was built in 2000. Overall, this concentration results from the complex 
intervention of physical, economical, and political factors on various scales, from the local to 
the global.  
                                                 
5
 This agreement is designed to open new shipping routes between the two Koreas, while allowing the free 
calling of northern and southern vessels in respective ports.  
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4. Conclusion 
 The analysis of traffic distribution within the North Korean port system is fruitful in 
many ways. It has overcome the scarcity of data that often characterizes constrained and 
closed economies. Although measuring traffic in deadweight tonnage or slot capacities cannot 
account for the real volumes handled at the docks, the excessive costs that characterize 
shipping to and from North Korean ports provide a sufficient argument in favor of 
considering those shipments as an indicator of the level and nature of port activities.  
This study complements our understanding of port system concentration in general 
(see Table 4 for a synthesis). The classic process of economic polarization of the core region 
in developing countries is verified in North Korea by the concentration of traffic at one main 
load centre, Nampo. North Korean authorities failed to sustain the principle of regional 
balance that was based on the polycentric urban system. Before the isolation, the transport 
system could provide the capital region with a good access to East and West coasts. Thus, 
traffic shift and concentration in North Korea resulted from the impact of geopolitical crisis 
rather than from the spatial agglomeration of economic activities.  
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
Internal political crisis and natural disasters contributed to the dereliction of the 
transport system, resulting in disconnection amongst North Korean provinces. As a result, the 
core region has become increasingly isolated. Only Nampo and other Western cities located 
near the capital city have sustained their activities. Distance and elevation also played an 
important role, resulting in excessive concentration. The relative failure of socialist planning 
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principles and the search for short-time economic survival provoked concentration in the port 
system.  
This is why the observed trends affecting the North Korean port system are both 
universal and exceptional. On the one hand, the concentration trend shows that North Korea 
fits quite well with the general models of port concentration in developing and transition 
countries. On the other hand, the North Korean case shows that concentration may occur 
despite the absence of economic growth, unlike other countries. Perhaps the peace treaty with 
the US and the lifting of the trade embargo in the foreseeable future may pave the way for 
further evolution of the port system. 
Future research shall develop towards three main directions. First, the international 
comparison of port system evolution in constrained economies is necessary to better verify the 
uniqueness of particular contexts and their possible common trends. Second, surveying the 
interested shipping lines calling at North Korean ports in recent years would improve our 
knowledge about the current state of port infrastructures and shipping in North Korea. The 
names and contact information of the shipowners are also provided by Lloyd’s database on 
vessel movements. Third, a better understanding of North Korea’s internal spatial change 
would greatly benefit from active collaboration with non-governmental organizations, 
transport companies involved in border trade (e.g. Russian, Chinese), and foreign companies 
investing in North Korea (e.g. European).  
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Table 1: Selected studies on port system concentration, 1963-2008 
Author(s), year Year Area Concentration factor(s) De-concentration factor(s) 
Taaffe, Morrill & Gould 1963 Africa Inland transport corridors  
Rimmer 
1967a, 
1967b 
Australia, New Zealand Inland transport corridors  
Kenyon 1970 United States 
Metropolitan dominance (New 
York) 
Hinterland-foreland changes 
Hilling 1977 Ghana 
Spatial consolidation and 
rationalization 
 
Hayuth 
1981, 
1988 
United States 
Development of large load 
centres, intermodalism 
Peripheral port challenge 
Slack 
1985, 
1990 
United States Level of intermodalism Port selection by carriers 
Barke 1986   
Congestion, lack of space for further 
expansion 
Hoare 1986 United Kingdom 
European integration, national 
connectivity 
 
Charlier 1988 Belgium 
Stable structure of port 
hierarchy 
Traffic specialization 
Airriess 1989 Indonesia 
Exogenous development 
through hinterland penetration 
 
Kidwai 1989 India  New port construction (bulk) 
Kuby & Reid 1992 United States 
Technological innovations, 
disappearance of smaller 
ports 
 
Todd 1993 Taiwan 
Export-led policy and growth 
poles 
Balanced regional development 
Starr 1994 United States 
Economies of scales in liner 
shipping, decreased port calls 
 
Hoyle & Charlier 1995 East Africa Concentration of investments  
Charlier 1998 Benelux  
Hinterland development (railway), port 
selection (Zeebrugge) 
Notteboom 1997 Europe  
Traffic shifts to medium-sized (new) 
ports 
Wang 1998 Hong Kong, China 
Technological advance of 
Hong Kong 
Port competition, congestion, modal 
shift, high handling costs 
Hoyle 1999 Kenya 
Primate city polarization 
(Mombasa) 
New port development 
Brunt 2000 Ireland 
Metropolitan dominance 
(Dublin) 
National development plans 
Wang & Slack 2000 Pearl River Delta  Carriers’ pressures, port policy 
Slack & Wang 2003 Asia  Strategies of transnational operators 
De & Park 2003 World  Port competition, new technologies 
Notteboom & Rodrigue 2005 Developed countries  
Development of ‘off-shore’ hubs and 
inland terminals 
Ducruet & Lee 2006 World  
Urban growth, regional port 
competition 
Notteboom 2006a Europe, North America Stability of concentration  
Notteboom 2006b East Asia  New port development 
Ducruet & Lee 2007 Europe Core-periphery pattern Modal specialization of port cities 
Frémont & Soppé 2007 North European Range Stable traffic concentration Shipping line concentration 
Joly & Lemarchand 2007 World 
Regional integration, maritime 
range, traffic growth maturity 
National systems, intra-regional trade 
barriers 
Ducruet 2008 Northeast Asia Hub dependence Military control, logistics barriers 
Ducruet & Rozenblat 2008 World Graph centrality  
Lee, Song & Ducruet 2008 Hong Kong, Singapore 
Technological differentials, 
efficient planning policy 
Congestion, lack of space, port 
competition 
Source: realized by authors based on various sources 
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Table 2: Ports and maritime trade in socialist and developing countries 
Issues Socialist country Developing country 
Modal split 
Inland transport dominance 
(70-90%) 
Maritime transport dominance, low 
hinterland coverage 
Port system Traffic specialization 
Traffic concentration 
(50-90% in one main port) 
Port traffics Bulky products, low-valued goods 
Bulk imports and manufactured goods 
exports 
Trade pattern Among socialist partners Extraverted (e.g., free-trade zones) 
Equipment Lack of container handling facilities Poor technical standards 
Governance 
Centrally planned, bureaucracy and 
protectionism 
Cumbersome customs regulations, 
port and terminal privatization 
External connections Coastal and short-sea shipping 
Dependence on external hubs for 
long-distance shipping 
Source: authors, compiled from various sources 
 
Table 3: Infrastructure characteristics of North Korean ports 
Port 
Stevedoring 
capacity 
(tons) 
Crane 
capacity 
(tons) 
Number 
of 
cranes 
Berth 
capacity 
(000s 
tons) 
Total 
quay 
length 
(m) 
Nautical 
depth (m) 
Storage 
(000s 
sq.m.) 
Main cargo handled 
Cheongjin 
800 185 12 20 3,700 8.5 ~ 10 N/A General cargo, grain, coal, steel 
Haeju 240 45 4 10 1,300 7 ~ 12 21.8 Cement, ore, zinc, concentrates 
Heungnam 400 50 2 20 1,850 6.7 ~ 13 23.3 Fertilizers, magnesium clinker 
Nampo 750 170 3 25 2,100 10 ~ 13.5 20.8 Coal, cement, container, ore, grain, sundries 
Rajin 300 10 1 15 3,300 10 ~ 11 26.0 Coal, fertilizers, timber, sundries 
Seonbong 200 - - 5 1,500 7 ~ 23 26.0 Crude oil, petrochemical products 
Songrim 100 18 1 15 550 10 ~ 11 10.4 Iron ore, coal 
Wonsan 169 109 5 10 3,400 6.1 ~ 12.8 14.5 Cement, marine products 
Source: authors, compiled from various sources 
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Table 4: Synthesis of port concentration and de-concentration factors in North Korea 
 Concentration factors De-concentration factors 
Political 
 Collapse of the USSR and loss of socialist trades 
 Chinese influence spreading to Pyongyang 
markets (e.g. Daean Friendship Glass Factory) 
 Realization of Gaeseong Industrial Complex near 
the border and projection of Haeju Special 
Economic Zone near the Yellow Sea 
 Liberalization of inter-Korean shipments (e.g. 
Incheon-Nampo shuttle) 
 Ideological principle preventing excessive traffic 
concentration at the core region (Nampo-Pyongyang) 
 Ports developed under military control for defence 
rather than economic purpose; entry barriers to 
foreign ships (e.g. special license) 
 Geopolitical isolation and trade embargo limiting 
trade activities and traffic growth 
 Humanitarian shipments to less accessible 
populated regions (e.g. Cheongjin, Heungnam) 
Economical 
 Decline of heavy industries in specialized cities 
(rust belt) 
 Demographic and economic polarization of 
Pyongyang core region concentrating skilled labour 
and most of the 20% maintained factories 
 Labour shift to western plains returning to 
agricultural activities (e.g. rice paddy fields) 
 Formation of the Nampo-Pyongyang industrial 
corridor through foreign investment 
 Maintained economic activities of large industrial 
concentrations outside Pyongyang and prospects for 
reactivating mines close to seaports (e.g. Danchon) 
 Resilient proximity trade with Japan and Russia 
through Eastern ports (e.g. ferry service, fisheries) 
 Development projects at border and coastal areas 
(e.g. Sinuiju, Raseon, Tumen, KEDO, Gaeseong, 
Geumgang, Namyang, Wihwa-Bidan) 
 Self-contained urban areas relatively independent 
from the core economic region (socialist planning) 
Logistical 
 Remoteness of Eastern ports from the core 
region vs. centrality of Pyongyang (highways, 
Sunan international airport) 
 Inland transport limitations (e.g. tunnel 
obstruction, army tolls, lack of oil supplies, 
pavement dereliction) 
 Increased impact of natural factors on domestic 
circulations (e.g. climate, elevation) 
 Modernisation and good accessibility of Nampo 
(e.g. new container terminal, Songgwan terminal, 
Young Hero highway) 
 Two separate coasts with five main ports in the East 
and three in the West 
 Pyongyang traffic dominantly land-based through 
Sinuiju (80% of North Korean exports) 
 Technical limitation of the West Sea Barrage for 
Nampo up to 50,000 DWT and low potential for 
barging on Daedong River (e.g. sands) 
 Natural advantage of Rajin as ice-free port and 
strategic location for Japanese, Chinese, Russian and 
Mongolian transit trade between Europe and Pacific 
Source: authors 
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Figure 1: Transportation nodes and corridors in Northeast Asia 
 
Sources: drawn by authors based on ERINA (2008), Containerisation International (2006), Helders (2008) 
 
Figure 2: Geographical layout of the North Korean territorial and transportation system 
 
Sources: drawn by authors based on various sources 
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Figure 3: Container traffic concentration in North Korea, 1985-2006 
 
Source: elaborated by authors based on LMIU 
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Figure 4: Vessel traffic at North Korean ports, 1985-1991 
 
Source: realized by authors based on LMIU data 
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Figure 5: Vessel traffic at North Korean ports, 1992-1998 
 
Source: realized by authors based on LMIU data 
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Figure 6: Vessel traffic at North Korean ports, 1999-2006 
 
Source: realized by authors based on LMIU data 
 
 
